


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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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South Vietnam: The initial widespread enthusiasm in South Vietnam over the US air strikes against the North may give way to a letdown and to renewed dissatisfaction with Khanh's leadership.

Much of the popular support for the US action comes from articulate Vietnamese, particularly refugees from the North, who think that the major burden of the war will soon be lifted from Vietnamese shoulders. These elements will be especially prone to discouragement if the upshot of the present crisis is merely the tighter controls that the Khanh government has imposed under its "state-of-emergency" decrees.

There are already some signs of apprehension, particularly among lower levels of the population, that the US action may provoke strong Communist retaliation. Some Vietnamese also resent the idea of direct Western attack on Vietnamese nationals.

A few highly placed Vietnamese have voiced the fear that if the war against the Viet Cong is not prosecuted more effectively, the Khanh government may resort to dramatic substitutes. One such measure, for example, might be some action against Cambodia. Khanh has publicly linked the growing hostility of Cambodia with the threats from North Vietnam and Communist China.

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DAILY BRIEF

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USSR - Communist China: The USSR has asked the 25 Communist parties that helped it prepare the 1960 Moscow conference to meet on 15 December to arrange the convening of a world Communist conference in mid-1965.

This effort to break the current deadlock within the Communist movement defies Peiping's recent refusal to participate in any preparatory meeting called by Moscow this year. A Pravda editorial on 10 August, however, suggests a growing concern on the part of the Soviet leaders that unless they move soon they will lose the initiative in their drive to call a world Communist conference. Denouncing Peiping's obstructionist tactics, Pravda declared that the refusal of any party to participate should not prevent the preparatory meeting. Moscow's tactic is aimed at demonstrating that the USSR has the support of the "absolute majority" of world parties.

By insisting that there are no "insurmountable obstacles to the consolidation of unity" at international party meetings, the Soviet leaders are attempting in part to allay the fears of reluctant parties. Moscow has enough support, however, to ensure the participation of a substantial majority of the 26-party committee, although there may be significant holdouts.

Moscow has attempted to exploit the fact that several key foreign parties which have been unwilling to endorse an early conference have indicated approval of preparatory discussions. The USSR probably believes that Peiping's explicit opposition to beginning such preparations this year puts the Chinese in a vulnerable position.

The Chinese now will probably redouble their efforts to convince wavering parties that a gathering four months hence can only make matters worse.

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DAILY BRIEF

NOTES

UK-Cuba: [A British official has confirmed that the Clayton Equipment Company has a \$4.5-million contract to furnish ten diesel locomotives to Cuba. The Foreign Office has refused to reveal whether London is granting credit to cover the transaction, saying that it is not British practice to discuss private deals with another government. The US Embassy suspects that credit guarantees have been granted, probably on the same "three to five year" terms worked out with the Leyland Bus Company earlier this year.]

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DAILY BRIEF

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The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

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The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

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Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

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The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

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